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COMMENTS
BANKRUPTCY-STATUS OF CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING
FOLLOWING DEFAULT IN CHAPTER XI ARRANGEMENT-A significant
question arising under the Bankruptcy Act of 1938 which has not
been satisfactorily dealt with by the statute is the relative status, in
a bankruptcy proceeding precipitated by the debtor's default under the
terms of a chapter XI arrangement, of claims of creditors participating
in the arrangement and of those who became creditors after confirmation. Specifically, the problem is whether the old creditors, those who
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participated in the arrangement, can prove to the amount of their
original claims, or merely to the extent of their claims as scaled down by the terms of the arrangement; and whether the new creditors,
those extending credit after confirmation of the arrangement, can participate in the bankruptcy proceeding, and if so, whether their claims
should be accorded priority over those of the old creditors. A satisfactory solution must be premised upon the policy underlying chapter
XI arrangements, debtor rehabilitation. To foster rehabilitation, the
status accorded old and new claims should provide an incentive to
old creditors to participate in the arrangement, and, at the same time,
furnish an inducement to new creditors to extend credit after confirmation. The statute contains no express solution to these problems.
The few courts considering the matter have reached divergent and
unsatisfactory results. It has been recognized that the answer lies in
legislative action, for a proposed amendment is currently pending before Congress. Facing the possibility of a business recession, an
examination of the problem and its background and evaluation of the
proposed legislation are particularly timely and desirable.

A.
1.

COMMON LAW .AND STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO

1938

Revival of Claims Participating in Compositions or Extensions
a-fter Default by Debtor

a. Common Law. Arrangements under chapter XI and compositions under previous bankruptcy statutes had their inception in the
common law composition. It was well recognized at common law
that a debtor could contract with willing creditors for a discharge of his
debts upon part payment or promise of part payment of the amounts
owed them. Commercial expediency demanded that this type of
agreement be enforceable despite the difficulties courts encountered
in :finding consideration in the orthodox sense.1 _This is demonstrated
by the statement generally found in the cases that a composition is
an exception to the general rules governing consideration.2 The composition may be characterized as a third party beneficiary contract
between the creditors for the benefit of the debtor, as a promise by
the creditors not to sue the debtor on their claims,3 as a release of such
1 At common law part payment or promise of part payment of a liquidated debt was not
sufficient consideration to discharge the whole debt. Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. (H.L.) 605
(1884).
215 C.J.S., Compositions with Creditors §5; 26 CoL. L. RBv. 77 (1926).
s The legal difficulties arising from this characterization are indicated in Slater v. Jones,
L.R. 8 Ex. 186 (1873).
'
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claims,4 or, most logically, as being in the nature of an accord and
satisfaction. 5
If the creditors have accepted a promise of part payment rather
than part payment itself, the composition being wholly executed, the
original claims are discharged upon making the agreement. 6 A problem arises only if the agreement is executory. If the debtor defaults
on his promises under the composition, and such agreement is described as being in the nature of an accord and satisfaction, it is clear
that the creditors may recover on their original claims, for an accord
without a satisfaction is no defense to a suit on the contract sought
to be discharged. 7 Should the agreement be characterized otherwise,
the same result can often follow on the theory that default is a substantial failure of consideration giving the creditors an option to
rescind, which, if exercised, would place them in their original positions.8 The cases uniformly hold, often without mention of the theory
of decision, that default by the debtor under an executory agreement
revives the original claims of the creditors.9

b. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867, as amended in 1874. The common law composition was inadequate in many respects as to both the
debtor and his creditors. Participating creditors were not protected
against the possibility of dissenting creditors levying individual processes against the debtor's estate during the period when their own
original claims were barred by the agreement. From the debtor's
perspective, it failed as a rehabilitation device, inasmuch as nonassenting creditors could not be forced to participate and give a discharge. The first Congressional attempt to remedy these shortcomings
4 Bowen v. Holly, 38 Vt. 574
5 Jn re Clarence A. Nachman

(1866).
Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1925) 6 F. (2d) 427. Regardless of the
particular characterization chosen, conventional consideration can be found either in the
mutual promises of the creditors to forego a portion of their claims, or in the debtor's SUI•
rendering or promise to surrender his privilege of preferring one of his creditors over the
others. l CoNTRAcrs REsTATl!MENT §84, comment d (1932); l WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs, rev.
ed., §126 (1936).
6 Jn re Plaza Music Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1934) 10 F. Supp. 310; Mullin v. Martin, 23 Mo.
App. 537 (1886). There was a rebuttable presumption at common law that the composition
was a bilateral agreement. In re Carton Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1906) 148 F. 63.
7 Jn re Clarence A. Nachman Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1925) 6 F. (2d) 427; Allen v. Harris,
l Ld. Raym. 122 (1696).
s The creditors may elect to enforce the composition agreement and sue for damages on
the new cause of action. Brown v. Farnham, 55 Minn. 27, 56 N.W. 352 (1893); Bailey v.
Boyd, 75 Ind. 125 (1881). Mullin v. Martin, 23 Mo. App. 537 (1886), expressly denies
rescission, since the notes themselves had been taken as consideration.·
9 Home Ben. Assn. v. Gayle, (Tex. App. 1941) 147 S.W. (2d) 280; Braude v. Vehon,
201 Ill. App. 486 (1916); In re Carton Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1906) 148 F. 63; Flack v. Garland,
8 Md. 188 (1855).
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was the 1874 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act of 1867.10 This
enactment provided that the acceptance of a composition agreement
by a majority in number and three-fourths in value of a debtor's
creditors, upon approval by the court, had the legal effect of an
acceptance by all.11 In this manner, the non-assenting creditors were
compelled to accept the payments provided by the terms of the composition when this condition precedent was ful:6lled, or they were
barred from any satisfaction of their claims. Under this act composition became a judicial procedure subject to the supervision and direction of the bankruptcy court, and the express statutory authorization
relieved the courts of the necessity of inquiring into the matter of
consideration with all of its attendant difficulties. However, since
Congress did not indicate a contrary intent, it was generally agreed
that this statutory scheme did not change the existing view that the
debtor was discharged only after the composition was fully executed.12
3. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The composition provisions of
the Act of 189813 reflected the decided change in Congressional attitude toward bankruptcy legislation, which began to emphasize the
rehabilitation of the harassed but honest debtor.14 The principal
contribution of the new act was the discharge provision, section 14
(c). After the requisite number of acceptances by creditors, the act
provided for a confirmation of the composition by the court,15 and
stated that this confirmation would "discharge the bankrupt from his
debts, other than those agreed to be paid by the terms of the com1018 Stat. L. 178-186 (1874). The amendment was adopted, almost verbatim, from
the English Bankruptcy Act of 1869 (32 & 33 Viet. c. 71).
1118 Stat. L. 182, §17 (1874).
.
l2 It was generally held that, on default, creditors could sue on their original claims even
in a state court. Harrison v. Gamble, 69 Mich. 96, 36 N.W. 682 (1888); Whittemore v.
Stephens, 48 Mich. 573, 12 N.W. 858 (1882); Pupke v. Churchill, 91 Mo. 81, 3 S.W. 829
(1887); contra: Defford v. Hewlett, 49 Md. 51 (1878); In re Bayly, (C.C. La. 1879) 2 Fed.
Cas. 1085, held that the creditors' only remedy was enforcement of the composition, or,
resumption of bankruptcy. The English Bankruptcy Act of 1869 (32 & 33 Viet. c. 71)
§126, was also interpreted to allow revival. Edwards v. Coombe, L.R. 7 C.P. 519 (1872);
In re Hatton, L.R. 7 Ch. 723 (1872); Newell v. Van Praagh, 43 L.J.C.P. (n.s.) 94 (1874).
Most courts held that the amendment of 1874 did not change the view that if the
promise itself were accepted as satisfaction, action on the old claim was forever barred, but
a few departed from this and stressed that section 17 stated that payment should be made
in "money." Thus they held that notes (i.e., promises) did not suffice, even though the
parties might have intended to accept them in full satisfaction. Ransom v. Geer, (C.C. N.Y.
1882) 12 F. 607; In re Hurst, (C.C. Mich. 1876) 12 Fed. Cas. 1020; Defford & Ely v.
Hewlett, 49 Md. 51 (1878); contra: In re Kinnane Co., (D.C. Ohio 1915) 221 F. 762. For
criticism, see Pupke v. Churchill, 91 Mo. 81, 3 S.W. 829 (1887).
13 30 Stat. L. 549, §12 (1898).
14 In re Mirkus, (C.C.A. 2d, 1923) 289 F. 732.
15 30 Stat. L. 549, §12 (1898).
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position and those not affected by a discharge."16 Though it seems
clear from the statutory language that the order of the court confirming
the composition would discharge the original debts and leave the
creditors, in the event of default, with substituted causes of action
based on the obligations "agreed to be paid by the terms of the composition,"17 the early cases were by no means in harmony.
Some courts continued to apply the common law doctrine, reasoning that since unwilling creditors were forced to accept the composition, it would be inequitable to derogate from their prior privilege
either to sue in a state court in an assumpsit action for the amount of
their original claims or to prove this amount in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding.18 This question was eventually settled by the
holdings in Jacobs 11. Fensterstock19 and In re Mirkus, 20 which ruled
that confirmation of the composition was an absolute discharge and
that default under the terms of the agreement did not detract from the
efficacy of this order as a discharge. Consequently, upon default,
only the composed amount of the claim could be recovered in a suit
brought in a state court, or proved in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding.21 This latter view is the necessary interpretation to effectuate
the policy of debtor rehabilitation. To give the debtor a fresh start in
business he must be able to deal with new creditors on the basis that
he has been relieved of his old debts and left merely with the burden
of paying his obligations under the composition.
The wave of business failures attending the depression of the
- 1930's caused Congress to enact further debtor rehabilitation measures.22 Section 74 afforded relief, through compositions or extensions
of time for payment of debts, to non-corporate debtors who were not
insolvent but who needed simply a moratorium.23 Although confirmation of the agreement was not expressly given the effect of a discharge,
it seems clear that section 14 (c) applied equally to plans under section
74 as it did to compositions under section 12 of the act of 1898.24 The
16 30 Stat. L.
11 Ibid.

550, §l4c (1898).

18 Page v. Carton, 64 Misc. 645, 120 N.Y.S. 277 (1909); Am. Woolen Co. v. Friedman,97 Misc. 593, 163 N.Y.S. 162 (1916); Beck v. Witteman Bros., 185 App. Div. 643, 173
N.Y.S 488 (1918); cf. Wood v. Vanderveer, 55 App. Div. 579, 67 N.Y.S. 371 (1900); 31
A.L.R. 439 (1924).
10 236 N.Y. 39, 139 N.E. 772 (1923).
20 (C.C.A. 2d, 1923) 289 F. 732, 33 YALE L.J. 105 (1923).
21 See notes 19, 20, supra; also In re Kornbluth, (C.C.A. 2d, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 400.
22 47 Stat. L. 1467, §§73-77 (1933); 48 Stat. L. 912, §§77A, 77B (1934).
23 99 A.L.R. 1325 (1935); 33 CoL. L. REv. 704 (1933).
24 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 13th ed., 239 (Supp. 1938).
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terms of an extension agreement were held by one court to be sufficiently effective, even after default, to allow recovery only on the
obligations due under the extension.25 Presumably, the same result
would have been reached upon default under the terms of a composition, with the effect that distribution in a subsequent bankruptcy
proceeding would be made on the basis of the composed rather than
the original amount of the debts.
Section 77B, applicable to reorganization of corporate debtors,
provided that upon final confirmation of the plan of reorganization by
the bankruptcy court, the debtor was thereby disch~rged of his old
debts and obligations.26 The same effect should have been given to
this discharge provision as was accorded section 14 (c) in its application to compositions and extensions of individual debtors, although
this question does not seem to have been litigated. Thus, upon failure
of a confirmed plan of reorganization, the creditors affected would, in a
subsequent liquidation or bankruptcy proceeding, have only those
rights conferred by the terms of the plan.
2.

Status of Claims Arising Subsequent to Confirmation a~er
Default by Debtor

vVhether claims arising after confirmation should be accorded
priority over composed claims in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding
arguably should be made to hinge upon whether the composed creditors can prove to the amount of their original claims. If this were
permitted, it would be an obvious injustice to compel the new creditors
to share in the estate on a pro rata basis, as they have probably extended
credit on the assumption that the debtor's sole liabilities are those
represented by the composition. An examination of the reported cases
prior to 1938 fails to disclose any consideration of these factors or
determination of the status of new claims. Conceivably, one explanation is that prior to 1938 any bankruptcy following default was an
indepenqent proceeding, for there was nothing in earlier legislation
25Harts6.eld Co. v. Stinson, 51 Ga. App. 155, 179 S.E. 819 (1935). Under an exten•
sion agreement there is no discharge of any part of the original claims. Thus, the problem
of revival does not directly arise. But the analogous question, whether default allows a creditor immediately to sue for the entire debt, was presented in the Hartsfield case, and answered
in the negative. The statutory language expressly provided for disposition of the case where
there was a default under an extension. By implication it probably covered composition also.
Kinnane, "Some Aspects of Section Seventy-Four of the Banlcruptcy Act," 9 NoTRE DAMB
LA.w. 291 (1934).
2s 48 Stat. L. 912, §77B (1934).
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providing for retention of jurisdiction by the court and allowing it
to dismiss the composition and institute bankruptcy in the same proceeding.27 Thus both old and new claims, being in existence at the
time of commencing of a bankruptcy, were provable in that proceeding
and shared pro rata. This is the equitable result where, as the later
trend of authority indicated, default did not revive the composed
claims.28
B.

CHAPTER

XI

AlmANGEMENTs UNDER THE CHANDLER

OF

AcT

29

1938

The relative rights of old and new creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding precipitated by default of a debtor upon the terms of an
arrangement under chapter XI is dependent upon whether the court
has retained jurisdiction after confirmation of the arrangement.30 Only
if jurisdiction has been retained does the statute expressly dictate the
disposition to be made of the case upon default.31 Apparently, if jurisdiction is not retained, a subsequent bankruptcy will be an independent proceeding.
From the time of filing the chapter XI petition until issuance
of the order of confirmation, the court has complete jurisdiction over
the debtor and his estate. The operation of the business during this
period is a court operation, with a trustee, receiver, or the debtor himself in possession,32 and for the purposes of preserving the estate
during the formulation of a plan, the claims of those extending credit
during this period are given priority under section 64 (a) (I). Unless
otherwise stipulated in the plan of arrangement and in the confirma27 Section 74, which was added in 1933, did provide for liquidation, and perhaps bankruptcy, if the debtor defaulted in the performance of the plan. 47 Stat. L. 1467 (1933). See
Kinnane, "Some Aspects of Section Seventy-Four of the Bankruptcy Act," 9 NOTRE DAMB
LAW. 291 (1934). No cases have been found, however, dealing with the application of
section 74 to the problem of interim debts, treated in this comment.
28 At least, this result was reached upon failure of a plan of corporate reorganization
under section 77B. Clinton Trust Co. v. Elliott Leather Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 132 F. (2d)
299; In re Michel, Maksic, & Feldman, (D.C. N.Y. 1942) 48 F. Supp. 23.
29 52 Stat. L. 905-916 (1938).
30 The similarities of §§482, 483 and 666, 667 to §§377, 378 indicate the same problems
here discussed can arise under chapters XII and XIII. The problems can also arise under
chapter X §236. There are no cases which have considered these questions. But see Clinton
Trust Co. v. Elliott Leather Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 299.
s1 52 Stat. L. 913, §377 (1938).
s2 52 Stat. L. 908. §332: id. 909, §§342, 343 (1938).
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tion order,33 the court's jurisdiction for these purposes ceases upon
confirmation, at which time title to the assets revests in the debtor. 34
If jurisdiction is expressly retained, the question may arise as to
whether it was retained merely for the purposes of section 377, providing for disposition of the case upon default, or to enable the court
to retain the same control over the operation of the debtor's business
as it had before confirmation. There is considerable variance in the
few reported decisions concerning the language necessary to effect
a retention of the latter type. 35 If this jurisdiction is desired, it should
be clearly expressed in the order of confirmation, for rehabilitation
contemplates that the debtor be permitted to resume operation of his
business as quickly as possible, without judicial interference.36

I. Where Jurisdiction Has Been Retained a~er Confirmation
of an Arrangement
a. Status of old debts in bankruptcy proceeding following default
in the arrangement. Section 371, essentially the same as section 14 (c)
of the act of 1898, states that "The confirmation of an arrangement
shall discharge a debtor from all his unsecured debts and liabilities
provided for by the arrangement...." As indicated previously, section
14 (c) of the act of 1898 was finally interpreted to mean that confirmation of a composition had the same effect as a discharge in an
ordinary bankruptcy proceeding, and was unaffected by the debtor's
subsequent default under the composition. Although chapter XI revised the composition procedure of the act of 1898, neither the
terminology nor the policy pertaining to the effect of a confirmation
was substantially altered. Therefore, unless other provisions of the
Chandler Act demand a contrary result, the old debts should not be
revived upon default in a chapter XI arrangement.
33 In re Independent Macaroni Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1942) 46 F. S-qpp. 813, 51 A.B.R.
(n.s.) 50. Contra: In re Ohio Bldrs. & Milling, Inc., (C.C.A. 6th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 165.
Even though the plan contains no express provision for retention of jurisdiction, the court
retains a residuum of jurisdiction for certain purposes, none of which is pertinent to the issue
at hand. See 52 Stat. L. 912, 913, §§367(2), 367(3), 369, 370, 372, 386 (1938). See also
id. 844 §2a (21).
34 52 Stat. L. 882, §70 (i) (1938).
35 Vogel v. Mohawk Electric Sales, (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 126 F. (2d) 759; In re Irving
Blee. Sup. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1941) 41 F. Supp. 16, 48 A.B.R. (n.s.) 812; In re Irving Blee.
Sup. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1941) 46 A.B.R. (n.s.) 105; In re Plymack, (D.C. Cal. 1941) 48
A.B.R. (n.s.) 818; In re Gelardin, Inc., (D.C. N.Y. 1941) 41 F. Supp. 17.
36 Seedman v. Friedman, (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 290; In re Gelardin, Inc.,
(D.C. N.Y. 1941) 41 F. Supp. 17.
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In the only case where this question has been considered, Vogel 11.
Mohawk Electric Sales Co.,37 the court reached the opposite conclusion. Although the issue was not directly presented for decision, Judge
Learned Hand asserted that upon default "the 'arrangement proceeding' must be 'dismissed' and that of course revives the old debts."38
No authority is cited in support of this view, but it is reconcilable
with the idea expressed by the court that a dismissal of the proceeding under section 377 (I) is tantamount to a setting aside of the confirmation for fraud under section 386 (I). The confirmation order,
being an integral part of the arrangement proceeding, is nullified
upon dismissal of the proceeding and no longer stands as a discharge.
Prior to 1938, the sole basis upon which a composition, once confirmed,
could be vitiated by the court was fraud in its procurement.39 Sincethe Chandler Act provided an additional basis, default where jurisdiction is retained, the court argued that these are but two methods
of attaining the same end, that is, nullification of the arrangement
proceeding, and thus the old debts should be revived in both instances.
Under this view, a debtor could assert his original claim in an independent proceeding in a state court.
An intermediate approach, proposed in a leading textbook, is that
confirmation is a discharge of the debt as a claim against the debtor,
but does not destroy the debt as a claim in the proceeding. 40 Thus,
upon default by the debtor, the old creditors could prove to the extent
of their original claims in a subsequent bankruptcy, but could not recover this amount in an independent action in a state court. Absent
new creditors, there is no serious objection to either result regarding
revival. 41 Possible inequities arise upon determination of the relative
position of the old and new claims, however, and Judge Hand's reasoning as to revival has an undesirable effect upon the status of new claims.
b. Status of new debts in bankruptcy proceeding following default
in arrangement. A strict interpretation of the statutory language reveals that those creditors who extend credit after confirmation do
not participate in the subsequent bankruptcy proceeding. Section 355
provides that upon entry of an order pursuant to section 377 (I) or
37 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 126 F. (2d) 759, 55 H.Anv. L. Rav. 1207 (1942).
38 Id. at 761.
30 In re Klein, Inc., (C.C.A. 2d, 1927) 22 F. (2d) 906.
40 8 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., 1407 (1941). This theory has

never been
judicially considered.
41 Conceivably, difficulties might arise in the rare instance where the assets available
for distribution in the bankruptcy exceed the amount of the participating arranged claims.
If the theory of non-revival is pursued, what disposition should be made of such excess?
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(2) directing that bankruptcy be proceeded with "only such claims
as are provable under section 63 of this act shall be allowed. . . ."
Claims, to be provable under section 63, must be in existence at the
time of the £ling of the bankruptcy petition, where a chapter XI
petition is £led pending bankruptcy,42 or at the time of the £ling of
the chapter XI petition where it is an original petition.43 In either
situation, the claims of new creditors arise too late to be eligible to
participate in the bankruptcy proceeding.44 However, the new creditors
may proceed against the property acquired by the debtor after con:6.rmation, for the trustee in the subsequent bankruptcy gets title
to only that property which comprised the debtor's estate at the time
of con:6.rmation.45
This result is so inequitable that the courts have been astute to
fi_nd means of avoiding it. Several courts have treated the new claims
as expenses of administration, according them priority under section
64 (a) (1). 46 .This approach presupposes retention of such jurisdiction
as to give the court supervisory powers over the operation of the
debtor's business after con:6.rmation. The courts have been overly
indulgent in inferring a retention of this type of jurisdiction. Thus, an
order of con:6.rmation retaining jurisdiction "over the debtor· and his
property until consummation of his plan" has been construed as vesting
this degree of control and supervision in the court.47 As previously indicated, continued judicial tutelage of the business usually has an unfavorable effect upon the speedy rehabilitation of the debtor.
A second method, adopted in Vogel v. Mohawk Electric Sales
Co.,48 attributes priority status to the new claims under section 64
(b). This section provides that "Debts contracted ... after con:6.rmation of an arrangement, shall in the event of a . . . setting aside of the
con:6.rmation, have priority and be paid in full in advance of the payment of the debts which were provable in the . . . arrangement pro52 Stat. L. 913, §378 (1) (1938).
52 Stat. L. 913, §378 (2) (1938).
44 8 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., 1409 at 1410 (1941); contra: In re Ohio Bldrs.
& Milling, Inc., (D.C. Ohio 1941) 50 A.B.R. (n.s.) 830.
45 52 Stat. L: 879, §70 (a) (1938).
46 In re Irving Elec. Sup. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1941) 41 F. Supp. 16, 48 A.B.R. (n.s.) 812; ·
In re Irving Elec. Sup. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1941) 46 A.B.R. (n.s.) 105; In re Plymack, (D.C.
Cal. 1941) 48 A.B.R. (n.s.) 818; contra: In re Gelardin, Inc., (D.C. N.Y. 1941) 41 F.
Supp. 17.
47 In re Plymack, (D.C. Cal. 1941) 48 A.B.R. (n.s.) 818. See also other cases cited
in note 46, supra.
48 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 126 F. (2d) 759. See also In re Ascher, (D.C. N.Y. 1949)
C.C.H. BANKR. LAW REP.1[56,407.
42

48
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ceeding. . . ." Since a "dismissal" of the arrangement proceedings
under section 377 (I) was held equivalent to a "setting aside," section
64 (b) became operative, giving the new claims priority.49 Without
citation of authority or explanation, the court asserted that the claims
of new creditors were provable in a subsequent bankruptcy. If this
were correct, new claims could share pro rata with those arranged.
Having decided that default revived the original debts, however, the
court felt it necessary to accord priority to the new claims, for the
debtor would not be able to obtain new credit unless the new creditors
were assured that some favorable position would be given their claims.
The court rejected the argument that new creditors might be less
likely to anticipate failure of the arrangement because of fraud in its
procurement than because of default in performance; it therefore felt
that Congress did not intend to give more protection to the creditor
in the former instance than in the latter. Although new creditors are
injured to the same extent regardless of the reason for the failure of
the arrangement, their anticipations may be less justified where failure
is attributable to default. New creditors should realize that the probability of success in performance of the arrangement may have changed
materially since the court's determination that the plan was feasible.
Subsequent events, however, could have no effect upon the accuracy
of the court's original finding that the plan was not procured by fraud.
Moreover, new creditors have more adequate facilities for determining
the current financial condition of the debtor than they have for discovering antecedent fraud. Thus, restitution in the form of priority
is more justified where the creditor relies on the apparent absence of
fraud than where he relies upon the judicial opinion that the plan is
likely to succeed.
Any determination of the relative rights of old and new creditors
must be made with recognition that the fundamental policy of chapter
XI is the rehabilitation of the honest but unfortunate debtor. 50 In one
respect, the reasoning of the Vogel case furthers rehabilitation, for it
aids the debtor in securing new credit by giving priority status to
claims arising after confirmation. However, unless the old creditors
agree to the arrangement, the debtor will have no occasion for seeking
new credit. To implement rehabilitation it is necessary to grant a more
favorable position to the claims of old creditors than that allowed by
4 9 In a similar case, In re Ohio Bldrs. & Milling, Inc., (D.C. Ohio 1941) 50 A.B.R.
(n.s.) 830, the court expressly refused to equate "dismissal" to "setting aside," and thus
denied priority to the new claims under section 64 b.
50 In re Western Steel & Equip. Corp. (D.C. Ore. 1940) 45 A.B.R. (n.s.) 361.
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the Vogel case, in order to encourage their participation in an arrangement, and discourage their predisposition toward liquidation in a
straight bankruptcy proceeding.51 This result can be achieved by
permitting equal participation in the bankruptcy proceeding of the
new claims with the old, as scaled down. This scheme effects the
proper balance between providing an incentive to old creditors to
approve the plan, and to new creditors to extend credit after confirmation.
2.

Where Jurisdiction Has Not Been Retained a~er Confirmation
of an Arrangement

Where jurisdiction has not been retained to allow dismissal of the
arrangement proceeding pursuant to section 377, a bankruptcy proceeding following the default is an independent action. This action
leaves the arrangement proceeding undisturbed and renders inapplicable the argument advanced in the Vogel case in favor of reviving the
old claims. The confirmation order remains effective as a discharge
and the old claims are provable only to their arranged amounts. No
difficulty arises as to provability of new claims, since they are in
existence at the time of £ling the independent bankruptcy petition.
Obviously, the view that "dismissal" is synonymous with "setting
aside" for the purpose of granting priority under section 64 (b) has
no application, and the new claims share on a parity with the old, as
arranged.
Section 377 makes possible the institution of bankruptcy against
the debtor in the arrangement proceeding, in order · to allow
creditors to force the debtor into bankruptcy after default without the
commission of an act of bankruptcy. The operation of this provision
is made dependent upon retention of jurisdiction by the court, solely
to comply with the doctrine that judicial orders are enforceable only
where the court has jurisdiction over the parties or their property.
Therefore, this retention of jurisdiction should not be made the basis
for a distinction in the treatment accorded the relative status of the
two classes of creditors. As between them, the same result should
follow regardless ·of the means by which the subsequent bankruptcy
proceeding is commenced.
51Jn

re Ohio Bldrs. & Milling, Inc., (D.C. Ohio 1941) 50 A.B.R. (n.s.) 830.
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CONCLUSION

The desirable result, pro rata sharing of the new claims with the
old, as arranged, can apparently be attained only through an express
statement to this effect in a statutory amendment. This amendment
should also provide that the effective pate for determining the provability of claims and the vesting of the trustee's title in the subsequent
bankruptcy is the date of entry of the order under section 377 directing
that bankruptcy be proceeded with. This renders the new claims
provable and makes available for distribution to the creditors all assets
acquired by the debtor before entry of the order. Legislation providing
for the changes here suggested has been proposed and is currently
before Congress for consideration.52 Its passage is essential to resolve
the confused state of judicial opinion and to rectify the inequalities
of the present statute.

Myron]. Nadler and L.B. Lea, S. Eds.

52 R.R. 5693, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948). The present English statute also seems
to provide the solution suggested in this comment. Bankruptcy Act, 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5,
c. 59) §§ 16(16), 33(7). No cases under this act, or under prior English statutes, seem
to have presented the Vogel type fact situation. It is not clear how this proposed amendment
would affect the type of case discussed in note 41, supra.

